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Family Resemblances 	
At first glance, psychoanalysis and Ordinary Language Philosophy bear little resemblance. 
The apparent focus of psychoanalysis on the inner seems in fact to jar with the appeal to the 
ordinary. Indeed, since Ludwig Wittgenstein voiced his suspicions about Freud, philosophers 
have largely agreed that the two disciplines are, despite converging in some instances, 
ultimately incompatible. Stanley Cavell is an exception to this rule. In a review of Terrors 
and Experts for The London Review of Books in 1997 he picks up on Adam Phillips’ 
description in an earlier book of D.W. Winnicott’s “almost religious commitment to an idea 
of simple and personal truth, to an ordinary-language psychoanalysis.”1 Winnicott’s 
commitment to “an ordinary-language psychoanalysis” is, Phillips argues, based on the 
conviction that the how of what we say and do not say, and what we do and do not do, 
captures better than any psychoanalytic technique each of our simple, personal and often 
incommunicable truths. 2 Cavell shares this commitment to the ordinary as something that 
owes its therapeutic powers to its ability to capture the way we truly are. Cavell’s 
attentiveness to this aspect of Winnicott’s marks perhaps nothing more than a brief flash of 
recognition upon finding his own reflection in his work.  
There is also a different argument to be made here, namely that Cavell’s consideration of 
Phillips’ neologism shows that he is sufficiently taken by the apparent affinities between 
psychoanalysis and ordinary language philosophy to wonder whether there might a still to be 
acknowledged deeper kinship between them. In the term “an ordinary-language 
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psychoanalysis” he hears an invitation to consider more closely the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and philosophy as it is practiced by Wittgenstein, Austin and, presumably, 
Cavell himself.3 This essay takes up this invitation by considering the hitherto 
unacknowledged family resemblances between Cavell’s inheritance of Ordinary Language 
Philosophy, as demonstrated by his interpretation of scepticism, and object relations 
psychoanalysis, particularly the work of Melanie Klein and Winnicott.  
As the essay will show, in his reinterpretation of scepticism Cavell relies not merely on 
traditional Ordinary Language Philosophy but also on conceptual resources that, although not 
limited to them, are most prominently used by object relations psychoanalyst’s to flesh out 
the infant’s earliest experiences. In making this argument, it is not its aim to fashion Cavell as 
an inheritor of Freud, Klein and Winnicott rather than an inheritor of Austin and 
Wittgenstein. This is partially because the eclectic nature of Cavell’s corpus means that there 
are more than these two conceptual lineages at play (others include, for instance, Emerson, 
Thoreau, and Shakespeare). Most importantly, however, it is because the issue of inheritance 
or lineage—together with the questions of hierarchy or primacy that it brings with it—is 
deeply unsympathetic to the way the Cavellian project picks up on, harmonises with and 
augments insights from other discourses. Equally, talk of a mere affinity or similarity would 
not do justice to the depth of shared concern between Cavell’s Ordinary Language 
Philosophy and object relations psychoanalysis. Instead Cavell’s work on scepticism points 
us toward an area of inquiry where thought structures overlap, conceptual resources are 
shared and ideas have purchase in ways that are not constricted by disciplinary borders or 
concerns about conceptual heritage and superiority. The reason for this is not that the 
Cavellian project is governed by something akin to Jacques Derrida’s textual model, where 
texts and ideas may relate to each other not because they share a conceptual or historical 
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lineage or context but because all texts are reading heads for other texts.4 It rather hinges on 
the discovery of a significant and interrelated set of family resemblances.  
For Wittgenstein, family resemblances describe a relation between two or more things 
where some features are shared but no attribute is present in all. Allowing the cohabitation of 
similarity and dissimilarity, this concept is a reminder that drawing up links or limits of 
conceptual alliances is a complex and delicate undertaking. There are significant similarities 
between philosophical and psychoanalytical characterizations of scepticism, whether it is 
addressed as such or under the psychoanalyst’s study of the causes and consequences of the 
false self or disintegration. More importantly, both philosophy and psychoanalysis link 
infancy and scepticism to each other, either figuratively or causatively. Both in their own way 
then turn to the figure of the infant—both in terms of a figment of an adult’s deferred 
fantasies and as the subject of theorizations pertaining to either language acquisition or 
development in general—when considering the sceptical predicament. This essay will, 
however, also argue that although they share important traits, the descriptions of infancy in 
Ordinary Language Philosophy and object relations psychoanalysis are not completely 
congruent. But an acknowledgment of what separates these discourses does not invalidate 
what it is that they do share. On the contrary, whilst what is shared may invite interesting 
comparisons, Cavell’s interpretation of scepticism owes its originality to his willingness to 
move beyond mere narcissistic reflection to borrow structures of thought from 
psychoanalysis that challenge and potentially change some of the ways in which Ordinary 
Language Philosophy sees itself.  
In order to explore this significant and interrelated set of family resemblances this article 
describes a series of reading encounters between Ordinary Language Philosophy and object 
relations psychoanalysis that hinge in one way or another on the intersections between the 
experience of infancy and that of scepticism. The scene is set with a brief outline of what sets 
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Cavell’s Ordinary Language Philosophy apart from familiar interpretations of it; this section 
gives an account of the common ground between Cavell and psychoanalysis and how past 
work has considered it. The first reading scene the essay focuses on is Wittgenstein’s reading 
of Augustine’s account of how he learned to speak. A consideration of how Cavell’s reading 
of Klein has a bearing on the ways in which his sense of Augustine the infant differs from 
Wittgenstein’s follows. It then turns to how the Shakespearean psychoanalytic critic Janet 
Adelman draws on Winnicott and Cavell when offering her startlingly original interpretation 
of Shakespearean tragedy, thus revealing the kinship between these two thinkers. The final 
two sections explore the limits of Cavell’s and Winnicott’s shared conceptual horizons by 
probing their treatment of separateness and aloneness on the one hand and their hope about 




A Not So Ordinary Language Philosophy  
 
As philosophical “schools” go Ordinary Language Philosophy is rather soft-spoken. Yet, 
behind its seemingly demure exterior lies an extraordinarily ambitious meta-philosophical 
project. Ordinary Language Philosophy looks toward our ordinary, quotidian uses of 
language to cure philosophy of some of its more debilitating puzzlements, or to use 
Wittgenstein’s term, bewitchments [Verhexungen].5 For Ordinary Language Philosophy, 
many of these problems are rooted in the philosopher using language in a way that is 
markedly different from how he would use it when living ordinarily. In thus misusing 
language, the philosopher takes on the role of the sceptic: asking questions he would 
normally not consider, and pretending to inhabit a position toward the world and others that 
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he in truth does not, he finds himself separated from them. Language famously being our 
form of life, the sceptic’s misuse of language is indicative of a deeper alienation from the 
world. For Ordinary Language Philosophers, a particular use of language is, however, not just 
scepticism’s symptom, it is not even just its cause, it also is its cure. The appeal to ordinary 
language in times of philosophical or sceptical bewitchment is effective because, in 
reminding the sceptic of the ordinary use of our words and the ordinary forms of life they 
mark, it can remind them of their true relation to the world, to others and to themself. The 
suggestion is of course that matters are more straightforward than the figure of the sceptic 
fears.	 
Whilst it would be wrong to conflate Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s distinct contributions to 
Ordinary Language Philosophy, their appeals to ordinary language share the more or less 
overt postulation of something given and shared, a common ground that the sceptic-
philosopher’s feet have, despite their protestations, never left. For Wittgenstein the 
recounting of ordinary criteria refutes scepticism because they establish certainty about what 
the sceptic puts in doubt. For Austin our inherited ordinary language can bring us once again 
closer to the world and others, because in it are encoded certain values and ways of being 
together as humans. What both of these accounts have in common is that they, at least 
according to traditional readings, seek to show that the sense of separation that the sceptic 
suffers is an illusion belied by the ways in which ordinary language assures our continued 
togetherness. 
What sets Cavell apart from other proponents of Ordinary Language Philosophy is that in 
his reading neither Austin nor Wittgenstein denies the fact of separateness. It is because of 
this acknowledgment of separateness that in Cavell’s work a discussion of ordinary language 
often gives way to an examination of voice. For him ordinary language does not undo our 
common separateness, but as his analysis of Bizet’s Carmen, for example, shows, our voice 
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can highlight, even celebrate it.6 Separation is, of course, an important theme in philosophy. 
For Cavell, however, there is a crucial distinction to be made between separateness and 
separation: the fact that we are separate from each other does not mean that we are separated 
from each other. For Cavell separateness does not hinder our lives together; separateness 
must not necessarily separate us.  
A well-known passage from “The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy” states 
that “all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life’,” in short all “human speech 
an activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than” our ability 
and willingness to agree upon them.7 The literature on Cavell rarely recognizes how radical 
this assertion is. The claim that our ordinary attunement rests on nothing more and nothing 
less than our willingness and ability to agree with each other implies that there is no 
undergirding, shared, common structure that guarantees it. Separateness is affirmed. In the 
secondary literature on Cavell this acute sense of our separateness is more often than not 
glossed over by providing more or less overt accounts of precisely the kind of undergirding 
structure that Cavell’s work does away with in the first place.8 Espen Hammer is one of the 
few who acknowledge that this insistence on separateness means for Cavell that scepticism is 
“neither curable (Kant) or incurable (Hume),” but that separateness is an unavoidable aspect 
of our language, our forms of life.9 Even Hammer, however, does not explain under what 
circumstances this separateness—which ordinarily does not pose problems—grows into the 
sceptic’s sense of separation from the world. 
Separation, particularly the primary separation of birth, is an important theme in 
psychoanalysis. Cavell writes openly about his “intellectual debt” to Freud.10 His path from 
music to philosophy would indeed pass through psychoanalysis, with Cavell at one point 
even considering training to become a psychoanalyst.11 Even after he had abandoned any 
thought of training, Freud remained a lasting influence on his work, particularly in his 
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readings of Shakespeare and Hollywood films of the 1930s and 1940s. Whether Cavell draws 
on Freudian notions of hysteria in his reading of Bette Davies in Now, Voyager or Freud’s 
Wolf Man case in his reading of Hamlet, in much of his work relating to literature or film 
psychoanalysis is used as an interpretative tool, employed for instance for throwing light onto 
a character’s motivations. Other texts bear testament to Cavell’s more systematic engagement 
with psychoanalysis; most important amongst these is his work on Emerson and Thoreau, 
where he falls back on Freudian notions of transference and countertransference to work out 
a mode of reading that does philosophical work itself, that is, in other words, philosophically 
operative and significant.12 No less important, though less well-studied, is Cavell’s reading of 
Jacques Lacan’s reading of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” in In Quest for the Ordinary, which 
is testament to the extent to which psychoanalytical insights affect even core philosophical 
notions in Cavell’s project. In the piece Cavell connects Wittgenstein’s sense of “the 
everyday and its language” as “strange to themselves” to Lacan’s account of the uncanny 
nature of language and of the unconscious in order to suggest that the ordinary is not already 
attained but infinitely perfectible.13  
Freud’s importance for Cavell’s work, in particular in relation to the therapeutic powers of 
the act of reading that he most explicitly tackles in his work on Thoreau and Shakespeare, has 
been addressed by a number of different scholars with varying conclusions. Whilst Timothy 
Gould, for instance, argues that the mutual receptiveness Cavell observes in Thoreau’s 
account of reading and writing in Walden is indebted to his engagement with Shakespeare 
and Freud, he is reluctant to give too much systematic importance to psychoanalysis.14 There 
are also scholars who have acknowledged the importance of psychoanalysis for Cavell’s 
philosophy more enthusiastically, including Arnold Davidson, Ewa Plonowska Ziarek and 
Mulhall.15 For them the influence goes beyond a superficial incorporation of psychoanalytic 
terminology. Ziarek and Mulhall in particular recognize a cross-fertilization between 
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philosophy and psychoanalysis, where the recovery of scepticism not merely resembles 
psychoanalytic therapy, but becomes therapy in a psychoanalytic sense.16 Ziarek even goes so 
far as to speak, albeit briefly, of a “psychoanalysis of philosophy.” 17 Similarly, Mulhall 
speaks not merely of a “family resemblance,” but even of a “founding psychoanalytic 
claim.”18 What is striking about previous accounts of the relationship between Cavell’s 
philosophical project and psychoanalysis, whether sympathetic to the idea of a foundational 
influence or not, is that they are limited exclusively to Freud. Cavell’s invitation to think 
towards an ordinary-language psychoanalysis, however, suggests that Ordinary Language 




 Augustine Throws a Tantrum: Wittgenstein Reads the Confessions 
 
Wittgenstein famously begins his Investigations with a reading of Augustine’s account of 
how he learned language. Augustine was not, he writes, taught words “by way of formal 
instruction, as it was the case soon afterward with reading”.19 He learns by observing his 
elders, by for instance interpreting their body language and by using the mind that the grace 
of God bestowed on him: “No, I taught myself, using the mind you gave me, O my God.”20 It 
is a peculiar scene not merely because no purposeful teaching is taking place, but also 




The majores homines are remarkably animated, but their expressions are neither directed 
at the child, nor do not affect the child directly in any emotional way. It is interesting, too, 
that Augustine’s elders do not seem to make the same effort at interpreting his body language 
that he does with theirs.  It is true that the infant Augustine gets mad, but it is a rage that 
originates in his inability to make himself understood rather than in the adult’s inability or 
unwillingness to understand him. When Augustine, the infant—from Latin infantus, quite 
literally one who has no speech—tries to make his “wishes known to those who might satisfy 
them” and fails “because my desires where inside me, while other people were outside and 
could by no effort of understanding enter my mind” he resorts to “toss[ing] about” and 
“scream[ing]” and when he did not get his way he would “take revenge on them by bursting 
into tears” and by throwing a “tantrum.”21 Despite his outburst, or perhaps rather because of 
the calculation behind it (Augustine throws a tantrum not out of frustration but because he 
wants to take revenge), the infant here appears to be remarkably self-possessed, grounded in 
and already in control of a self. Put differently, the infant’s experience is centred on an 
already well-known and fully experienced interiority. For instance, in the passage just quoted, 
the attempt is not to better project his desires outwardly so as to be better understood; it is to 
allow the elders access into his mind. As the disjunction between the child and his elders 
suggests, the infant’s sophisticated inner world—full of desires and rage—is established 
before and independently of any significant interpersonal relationships.22 Augustine’s 
particular view of language thus also implies an underlying belief about the infant’s relative 
cognitive and emotional self-reliance. 
Wittgenstein seems to subscribe to this view of the infant when much later in the 
Investigations he asks whether we might not be “over-hasty in our assumption that the smile 
of an unweaned infant is not a pretence.”23 For Mulhall, the subtle shift from child [Kind] to 
an unweaned infant [Säugling] at this point of the Investigations is motivated by the wish “to 
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invoke a sake of human life so early that it has no room for the existence of certain relatively 
complex and necessarily intersubjective projects,” in order to make a point about the 
naturalness our forms of life, echoing it seems Augustine’s description of the infant’s mature 
inner life.24 It is, however, important to see Wittgenstein’s remark about the lying infant in its 
entirety; the suggestion that lying must be learned as any other language-game in fact runs 
counter to Augustine’s vision of the infant. Indeed, the notion that if the infant’s smile at the 
breast were indeed a pretense, then even this most primitive of lies would have to be learned 
from or with others. Wittgenstein’s critique of Augustine’s picture of language also 
challenges a particular picture of a supreme and autonomous self. In place of God-given 




A Condition of Derangement: Cavell Reads Wittgenstein with Klein 
 
Whilst, as Mulhall notes, Augustine’s elders were not interested in teaching, the problem 
with Wittgenstein’s elders is that they do not do anything apart from teaching: “they seem to 
look upon their child’s suffering solely as an opportunity for education, as if their concern for 
him extended exclusively to his prospects as a fellow-speaker.”26 Both Wittgenstein and 
Augustine to some extent think about the infant very much in terms of a miniature adult. 
Cavell’s sense of the infant is very different. What strikes Cavell most about this passage is 
the philosopher’s description of “how isolated the child appears.”27 He similarly remarks on 
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“the absoluteness in [the child’s] initial incapacity to make itself known,” and “its absolute 
reliance on its elders’ recognition of its attempts at expression, that is, on their recognition of 
the grip of its needs as the medium of expression.”28 This interest in the infant not merely as a 
leaner but also as someone seeking—and failing—to make a connection with those around 
him indicates the fact that any consideration of Cavell’s view of language must be preceded 
or at least accompanied by an inquiry into separateness. In his reading of Augustine’s account 
the infant is not self-reliant; his vocalizations are not aimed at wreaking revenge, but by his 
cries, babbling and movements the infant longs to establish a connection to his elders. If his 
elders recognized this as an attempt at communication, Cavell’s Augustine does not tell us. It 
is the child’s absolute, permanent and utter isolation that makes him think of it as “mad,” and 
if “not exactly deranged,” then certainly “in the condition of derangement.”29 “The World as 
Things” similarly speaks of “the child’s world as hedged with madness, negotiating 
melancholy for paranoia, reparation for destructiveness.”30  
No doubt, Cavell understands this absolute solitude in terms of “madness” or 
“derangement,” because behind his perception of the child’s derangement lies Cavell’s 
“experience of Melanie Klein’s accounts of the pre-verbal child’s development of experience 
in terms of paranoia and depression ....31” It is important to note that, as the quirkiness of “my 
experience of Melanie Klein’s accounts” implies, Cavell reads Klein—and this will be hardly 
shocking for those familiar with his work—selectively and idiosyncratically. The 
unorthodoxy or eccentricity of a reading does not, however, make the lessons learnt from it 
less formative. On the contrary, an author’s thought may strike us most profoundly in places 
where she may have not taken it herself. Klein’s work on child analysis was revolutionary 
because it assumed a vivid inner life in infants —phantasies—long before Freud and another 
leading lady of child analysis, his daughter Anna, thought possible. In Klein’s developmental 
model, at birth the infant has a very rudimentary, unintegrated ego governed by strong 
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instincts, which are in a first instance directed at the mother’s breast. The infant’s instinctual 
desires translate into “greedy, erotic and destructive phantasies” where the infant imagines 
“attack[ing]” or “rob[bing]” the breast that in turn lead to persecutory phantasies in which the 
infant fears to be punished for these attacks.32 Klein’s violent account of the nursing situation 
is notorious, but for all the apparent crassness of her descriptions of a cannibalistic—and yes, 
mad—infant, these early occurrences in the infant’s phantasy life play an important role for 
healthy development. Cavell thinks of the “deranged” child’s experience in terms of paranoia 
and depression. In phantasy, Klein writes in “Weaning” (1936), “the child sucks the breast 
into himself, chews it up and swallows it; thus he feels that he has actually got it there, that he 
possesses the mother’s breast within himself, in both its good and in its bad aspects.”33 In this 
early or paranoid-schizoid stage the good breast—the breast that is felt to clench the infant’s 
desire—and the bad breast—the breast that is perceived to be unwilling or unable to do so—
also become in phantasy the repositories of any good or bad experience the child makes. As 
Klein suggests in “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” (1946), this binary splitting is an 
integral part of healthy development, as it helps the infant to integrate enough good 
experiences to provide an anchor to shore up the self against the onslaught of life’s 
challenges. The second term Cavell chooses to characterize his experience of the child’s 
condition of derangement through Klein is “depression”; and indeed if development precedes 
within the bounds of normality and health these extreme paranoid anxieties and schizoid 
defenses are given up and make way for the depressive position, in which the child feels 
protective of the now-integrated good object and guilty about its previous attacks on it.34  
These Kleinian positions are also what “The Interminable Shakespearean Text” in the 
context of Lear’s perception of Cordelia’s “thanklessness” describes as “the idea of 
aggressiveness causing, and caused by, gratitude for lavishness, or rather of ingratitude for 
the idea of lavishness withdrawn or delayed.”35 We also reencounter these positions in “What 
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is the Scandal of Skepticism?” where again Cavell draws on Klein’s idea of “original 
murderousness” to start imagining “a basis for recognizing responsibility towards the other, 
as a kind of reparation for my having failed to acknowledge the other.”36 In this reading of 
Klein, the child only begins to recognize the other when “the other, which sustains life with 
its nourishment, manifests its separateness,” for instance through an “inevitable” and 
“momentary withdrawal or withholding of nourishment.” Such a withholding causes first “a 
murderous rage: and then a “persecutory guilt” in the child and thus marks “the first 
developmental stage Klein calls the paranoid position,” which in times makes way for the 
“schizophrenic position, in which reparation is offered for the prior aggressiveness. (Now we 
have two poles of responsibility: the mother’s, which is total but comes to an end; and the 
child’s, which is derivative but which has no assigned end …).”37 In fact, the Kleinian 
positions are reversed here; nevertheless, the passage speaks eloquently of Cavell’s 
familiarity with Kleinian thought. 
Although the defense mechanisms which Klein describes in “Notes on Some Schizoid 
Mechanisms” are normal, they can under certain instances—for example “if persecutory fears 
are very strong”—form “the basis for later schizophrenic illness.”38 Whilst the processes 
Klein describes are limited to the infant’s phantasy life, “the effect of this phantasy is a very 
real one, because it leads to feelings and relations (and later on, thought-processes) being in 
fact cut off from one another.”39 Some shared features between Cavell’s descriptions of 
scepticism and Klein’s account of the paranoid-schizoid position are already becoming 
apparent: most prominently a sense of separation and the experience of a severing between 
inner and the outer. Equally, Augustine’s account of an angry, revenge-hungry and 
manipulative infant could come straight out of Klein. Despite the fact that with his 
description of the child as “deranged” Cavell draws on Klein and that there are indeed some 
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similarities between scepticism and the paranoid-schizoid position in particular, we must look 




The Nursing Couple: Adelman Reads Shakespeare with Winnicott and Cavell 
 
There are good reasons to think about the resonances between Cavell and psychoanalysis, 
and object relations theory more in particular, in the context of Shakespeare: both his 
psychoanalytically most astute readings and his most eloquent impressions of the 
consequences and possible causes of the sceptic’s avoidance can be found in his work on the 
plays. My main guide in navigating the psychoanalytically rich ground of Cavell’s reading of 
Shakespearean tragedy is Janet Adelman. Despite an absolute silence on the subject in the 
scholarship on Cavell, Adelman is a strong influence on his interpretation of scepticism in 
and through Shakespearean tragedy, just as his work has informed her reading of the latter.40  
Scrutinizing images of pregnancy, childbirth and nursing in the plays and contextualizing 
them with early modern ideas about a mother’s perilous influence, in her seminal Suffocating 
Mothers Adelman convincingly shows that Shakespeare’s tragic heroes recognize the origin 
of their unbearable predicaments to be maternal. As the Coriolanus essay “‘Anger’s My 
Meat’: Feeding, Dependency, and Aggression in Coriolanus” argues, her original 
interpretation of Shakespearean tragedy is drawn not from a generic understanding of 
psychoanalysis but more specifically from an interest in “feminism and object-relations 
psychoanalysis.”41 Object relations theory is of course commonly associated with Klein, but 
another notable proponent is Winnicott.  
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The fact that Adelman collocates her reading of tragedy in Cavell and Winnicott is crucial 
for any mapping of the conceptual resources that psychoanalysis and Ordinary Language 
Philosophy share. Both authors are, despite their demotion here to a footnote, a strong 
influence on her interpretation of tragedy through scepticism and vice versa: 
 
In associating this crisis of faith specifically with the mother’s body and with the loss 
of interior aliveness, and the resolution of this crisis with the return of the capacity to 
play, I am following the insights of Winnicott, for whom the mother’s reliable 
response to the infant’s needs, especially in the nursing situation, creates “a belief that 
the world can contain what is wanted and needed, with the result that the baby has the 
hope that there is a live relationship between inner reality and external reality, 
between innate primary creativity and the world at large” (The Child, the Family, and 
the Outside World [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964], p.90). (Cavell’s 
formulations are of course congruent with Winnicott’s; in his reading of The Winter’s 
Tale, birth stands for primary separation, what the sceptical annihilation of the world 
– like the paranoid’s refilling it with its own projections – is attempting to deny 
[Disowning Knowledge, esp. pp. 206–13]).42  
 
Adelman is right in thinking of Winnicott and Cavell together. In place of Klein’s 
emphasis on internal processes, instincts and phantasies, to which interpersonal relationships 
take a secondary role, Winnicott establishes the primary importance of interpersonal 
relations.43 Whilst for Klein the world that the infant learns about is met with innate instincts 
that are already present in them, in the picture that emerges from Winnicott’s account there 
are no such innate and primary phantasies to be satisfied. As Phillips puts it, Winnicott’s 
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infant “clamours for intimacy, not only for relief of tension—for relatedness, not simply for 
satisfaction.”44 Similarly, in Cavell’s reading of the passage from the Confessions the child’s 
existence and sanity depend on his elders’ ability and availability to heed it. It is utterly 
dependent on its elders to interpret “the grips of its needs as the medium of expression45” The 
strangeness of the turn of phrase “the grips of its needs” renders well the intense and inchoate 
nature of the infant’s demands not for instinctual satisfaction but for connection. It is in the 
depiction of this intense drive to connect that Cavell’s proximity to Winnicott rather than 
Klein becomes evident.  
The difference between Klein’s and Winnicott’s accounts may seem at first too 
psychoanalytically subtle to be pertinent to a reconsideration of a philosophical view of 
scepticism. Klein defends herself vigorously against the charge against her that all infants are 
deranged.46 And in fact the splitting mechanisms at work during the paranoid-schizoid stage 
can lead to but do not in themselves necessarily constitute madness. This is recognized in 
Cavell’s phrasing about the child being “not exactly deranged” but “in the condition of 
derangement.”47 Nevertheless, Klein equips the infant ab initio with aggressive phantasies, 
which the child learns to negotiate more or less well depending on the care it receives. For 
Winnicott, in early life there is no such condition of derangement; “ordinary babies are not 
mad,” he writes.48 Whilst his desire made Klein’s infant a madbaby, in Phillips imaginative 
phrase a “misfit,” Winnicott’s infant is determined in very different terms. This does not 
mean that the infant cannot become mad; Winnicott himself describes the individual from its 
very “beginnings of ‘I am’” as “raw, … undefended, vulnerable, potentially paranoid.”49 But 
the crucial difference between Winnicott’s and Klein’s developmental accounts is this: any 
actual paranoia in the Kleinian infant is rooted in internally arising phantasy, whereas for 
Winnicott it originates primarily in the infant’s environment. On its path to health and 
maturity Klein’s infant cannot but help cross through a condition of derangement, whereas 
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Winnicott’s infant can hope to be spared it. 50 Klein’s view that this inner life is governed by 
innate instinctual impulses could in fact not be further away from Cavell’s Wittgensteinian 
interpersonal view of self.51  
Just how different Winnicott’s views on the infant self is from Klein’s is clarified when 
considering his work on nursing. Although both Klein and Winnicott concentrate on the 
nursing situation, they focus on markedly different aspects: Klein describes the infant’s 
initiating aggression, whereas Winnicott always focuses on the infant as a dependent and 
relation-seeking part of the nursing-couple dyad. In a “Close-up of Mother Feeding Baby” 
(1949), Winnicott sketches an ordinary nursing situation, where the nipple is offered, contact 
with the mouth made, the infant suckles and then averts his face from the breast. Here, “the 
baby had an idea, and the breast with the nipple came, and a contact was made. Then the 
baby was finished with the idea and turned away, and the nipple disappeared.”52 Highly 
sensitive to her baby’s feelings, the ordinary devoted mother is, Winnicott argues (using no 
doubt unawares very Wittgensteinian terminology), “attuned.”53 Attunement is incidentally 
also the term chosen by developmental psychologist Daniel Stern to describe a feedback loop 
between mother and infant, in which both parties are, it seems, engaged in a finely tuned 
choreography and “attempting constantly to adjust their behaviour to one another’s.”54 In this 
ordinary nursing situation “natural feeding is given exactly when the baby wants it, and 
ceases as he ceases to want it.”55 The baby has the illusion of omnipotence; the nipple does 
not impinge on the infant, but is created by them when needed. This illusion of omnipotence, 
made possible by the mother’s “adaptive technique,” has crucial developmental importance, 
because, as is already suggested in the passage from The Child, the Family, and the Outside 
World cited in Adelman’s footnote on Winnicott and Cavell, it gives the baby “hope that 
there is a live relationship between inner reality and external reality, between innate primary 
creativity and the world at large.”56 In this early phase of development the mother’s 
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responsiveness allows the infant self to integrate and to become secure enough to be “alive” 
to itself and to others. A well-managed nursing situation hence helps the infant to come to 
terms with the primary separation that birth marks, and to integrate his self securely. 
Nursing is also important in Adelman’s interpretation of Shakespearean tragedy, 
particularly in her reading of Coriolanus. There may indeed be no play of Shakespeare’s 
more concerned with the complex relationship between mother and child, crystallized in the 
nursing situation with its myriad of possibilities for fulfilment and frustration of needs. 
Coriolanus is filled to the brim with images of hunger, of neglect, of not having enough food, 
love, power. First amongst the unsatisfied: the nursing couple of Coriolanus and Volumnia, 
whose name already poses the question of a volume waiting to be filled, of a want. That the 
nursing situation should also haunt Cavell’s reading of Shakespearean tragedy speaks again 
to the strength of Adelman’s influence. Cavell notes the ear-whispering scene between 
Hermione and Mamillius in The Winter’s Tale with much interest. Here his sense of the 
“mutually seductive gestures” between Hermione and Mamillius—whose name is again 
incidentally reminiscent of the maternal breast or mammilla and which brings to mind a 
much younger child—brings to mind Winnicott’s view of a well-managed nursing situation 
where mother and infant are wrapped up in each other.57 Whether through Adelman or by a 
more direct route, Winnicott’s notion of the central importance of the nursing situation finds 
its way into Cavell’s thinking about scepticism with and through Shakespearean tragedy. His 
focus on the nursing situation resonates strongly with object relation theory’s view of the 
foundational, integrative function of the first relationship rather than with Klein’s view of the 
instinctively aggressive infant.  
Cavell shares Winnicott’s sense that infancy clarifies the conditions for scepticism. The 
importance of the mother–infant relationship is acknowledged throughout Disowning 
Knowledge and particularly in the “Introduction” where Cavell claims that “what philosophy 
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registers as uncertainty in our knowledge of the existence of the world is a function of, say 
intellectualization of, the child’s sense of loss in separating from the mother’s body.”58 At the 
same time, the terms with which Winnicott describes the effect of prolonged and consistent 
misattunement between mother and child bear striking resemblance to Cavell’s descriptions 
of scepticism. On a separate sheet of paper found attached to Winnicott’s chapter on the 
establishment of a relationship with external reality, in the posthumously published 
manuscript of Human Nature, he describes two kinds of relationship that can be the result of 
a failure of adaptation in infancy. The first is a “silent secret relationship to an essentially 
personal and private inner word of subjective phenomena,” which is essentially divorced 
from the outside world.59 In the other, a false self is formed. The infant becomes “a collection 
of reactions to impingement,” forever hiding behind “a false self, which complies with and 
generally wards off the world’s knocks.”60 In the first scenario, the true self, though “alive” 
or “real,” remains essentially incommunicable. In the second case, the self is, though 
compliant to the outside world, false.61 The false self is in a state of disintegration: “the term 
disintegration is used to describe a sophisticated defence, a defence that is an active 
production of chaos in defence against unintegration in the absence of maternal ego-support, 
that is, against the unthinkable or archaic anxiety that results from failure of holding in the 
stage of absolute dependence”62 Importantly, although complete insularity of self is 
incompatible with health, the ability to access states of unintegration when the infant does not 
feel “ a need to integrate, the mother’s ego-supportive function being taken for granted” is 
characterised as a developmental achievement. 63 Cavell too thinks about the sceptic’s 
“conversion of metaphysical finitude into intellectual lack” in terms of a defensive 
mechanism as opposed to the ability to at times simply relax into one’s voice and 
separateness.64 It seems that Cavell’s and Winnicott’s views on the alignment of infancy and 
scepticism are truly, to borrow Adelman’s word, congruent. Further transposing Winnicottian 
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insights to Cavell’s reading of scepticism (like Adelman does), this means that we are born 
into the condition of scepticism (and up to here Klein would agree). Contra Klein, however, 
our sceptical condition flowers to scepticism not from the inside out, from something that we 




Cavell’s Separateness and Winnicott’s Aloneness 
 
Whether or not one subscribes to the view that scepticism begins at the mother’s breast, the 
resonances between Winnicott’s and Cavell’s way of looking at infancy, particularly as heard 
in Adelman’s work, bring into view the particularity of Cavell’s interpretation of scepticism. 
For Adelman, the psychological fact behind the pronounced nursing and feeding imagery in 
Coriolanus is simple: “the taking in of food is the primary acknowledgment of one’s 
dependence on the world, and as such, it is the primary token of one’s vulnerability.”65 She 
understands the play’s obsessive returns to questions of feeding, starving and nursing as 
grappling with the issue of our vulnerability and mortality. For Adelman, then, what is at the 
heart of tragedy and the tragic hero’s predicament, is the avoidance of his separateness, 
exemplified par excellence in the infant’s vulnerability to and complete dependence on their 
mother. This is what Winnicott calls the “unthinkable or archaic anxiety” resulting from 
“absolute dependence.”66 Incidentally, this fear of vulnerability and dependence also provides 
his explanation for the misogyny that Adelman diagnoses in Shakespeare’s tragic heroes: 
“The general failure of recognition of absolute dependence at the start contributed to the fear 
of WOMAN that is the lot of both men and women.”67 Here aggression dissimulates and 
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most importantly defends vulnerability.68 The tragedy of this self-defense mechanism is that, 
following the logic of what Derrida calls autoimmunity, it destroys the very thing that it seeks 
to protect: a connection to others. 
The fact of separateness dictates the vital importance of being able to connecting to 
others. But what is separateness? What Adelman’s tragic hero and what Cavell’s sceptic 
avoids is the fact that “we are separate, but not necessarily separated (by something); that we 
are, each of us, bodies, i.e. embodied; each is this one and not that, each here and not there, 
each now and not then.”69 For Winnicott too the primary separation of birth marks the fact 
that even when we are enclosed in our mother’s womb our body is separate from hers. 70 The 
image Winnicott returns to again and again to think about these “earliest states” is one of two 
non-touching bubbles, a smaller one, the individual, enclosed within a bigger one, the first 
environment, the mother.71 In less than ideal circumstances, in which the environment 
encroaches or impinges on the individual, the momentum goes from the outside towards the 
inside and the outer bubble risks bursting the smaller bubble by pressing on it. Under near-
perfect circumstances, the individual discovers his environment through his own movement, 
for instance through a move towards the nipple at the theoretical first feed or, earlier, through 
a movement in the womb. Here the border of the smaller bubble will move outwards to touch 
the larger bubble, but it will do so without bursting, remaining separate. In highlighting the 
importance of the primary relationship between infant and mother Cavell does not necessarily 
give scepticism a primal scene. He is, however, pointing us with renewed urgency toward the 
realization that the sceptic’s avoidance is triggered by the unavoidable and terrifying and 
terrifying because unavoidable fact that our bodies are separate from others, that our bodies 
are even at times separate from ourselves. And that we, like our bodies, are mortal.  
The similarities to Winnicott bring to the surface a more granular picture of Cavell’s 
rather elusive concept of separateness. By his simple “diagrammatic representation” of the 
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smaller bubble enclosed in a bigger one Winnicott highlights the importance of the 
environment at this early stage for the long-term health of the individual. But he also posits 
“the absolute isolation of the individual” at birth.72 This primary and original isolation is not 
something that could be avoided or overcome but it forms “the basis of human nature in 
terms of individual development.”73 Even after the initial steps of development have been 
absolved—and in fact, like Cavell, Winnicott believes that our human development is never 
finished and that we are infinitely perfectible—this separateness remains. In fact, for 
Winnicott, to a large extent development can be understood as that arch which step after step 
takes the individual “towards recognition of the essential aloneness of the human being.”74 
Beyond our ability to communicate and our enjoyment of being with others, each individual 
remains “an isolate, permanently non-communicating, permanently unknown, in fact 
unfound.”75 Riffing on his vocabulary, Phillips describes Winnicott’s self as “isolated, secret 
and silent.”76 One cannot but be struck by the similarities of this account of aloneness and 
Cavell’s description of the human condition of being “hidden and silent and fixed.” 77  
The Claim of Reason suggests that perhaps “we are forced to the concept of knowledge” 
when faced with the problem of scepticism, “because we do not quite know how to speak of 
the other’s aliveness to himself, his being together with himself, by himself, in as it were a 
private place, a place he has to himself.”78 The notion of “aliveness” is to be sure Winnicott’s 
and also describes the secure self’s ability to rest in states on unintegration. Cavell’s 
insistence on the condition of separateness as not being debilitating to human relationships 
but foundational to them is reminiscent of the way Winnicott views unintegration—as 
opposed to debilitating disintegration—as the point from which all development must 
commence. For Winnicott, our self is most alive and true when, not afraid of the dependence 
that our primary separation marks, we remain open to the experience of being uinintegrated. 
For Cavell, too, the health of our bonds to others and ourselves depends on our ability to 
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resists the sceptical temptation of denying how separate, dependent and mortal we truly are. 
Does Cavell’s separateness then have to be understood in terms of Winnicott’s aloneness as 
the description of this “private place” seems to suggest? Both Winnicott and Cavell stress the 
absoluteness of privacy just as they do its importance. For Winnicott, everything that happens 
in early life is in service of protecting the inner, incommunicado, separate element which is 
“sacred and most worth of preservation.”79 For Cavell, the idea of privacy inherent in 
philosophy’s fantasy of a private language is, in fact, not radical enough, because it “fails to 
express how private we are, metaphysically and practically.”80 Our privacy is both less and 
more deep that the sceptic wants to admit. It is deeper, in the sense that our separateness, just 
like our mortality and the finiteness of our bodies cannot be intellectualized away. It is less 
deep, because this is not as much of a hindrance to our understanding each other as the 
sceptic would like us to believe.  
There is a tendency to smooth over Cavell’s acknowledgment of separateness, 
undoubtedly because it feels too close to scepticism. Ordinary Language Philosophy is 
traditionally understood to counter scepticism by insisting on the ordinariness of our 
connection to each other. Cavell’s work shows to the contrary that an insistence on the 
ordinariness of our connection to each other does not have to entail a denial of our common 
separateness, but must entail our full acknowledgment of it. The fact that both Winnicott and 
Cavell embrace the fact of separateness does not make them sceptics. Quite the opposite, as 
Adelman rightly notes, “birth stands for the primary separation, what the sceptical 
annihilation of the world … is attempting to deny.”81 Indeed, the avoidance of the 
separateness that our primary dependence on our mother symbolizes would precisely mean 
falling back into scepticism’s compulsive patterns. For Winnicott, “the traumatic experiences 
that can lead to the organization of primitive defences, belong to the threat to an isolated 
core, the threat of its being found, altered, communicated with.”82 Cavell argues very much 
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along the same lines in offering a new reading of the sceptic’s fantasy of private language “as 
an attempt to account for, and protect, our separateness, our unknowingness, our 
unwillingness or incapacity either to know or to be known.”83 For both thinkers, separateness 
an sich is not a problem; indeed it is a possibility that for neither can be avoided and 
therefore must be acknowledged. This is something that is deeply understood in Cavell’s 
reading of the motif of nurturing in Coriolanus. In his way of looking at the play, the 
“condition of insatiability (starving by feeding, feeding as deprivation)” manifested by 
Coriolanus and Volumnia “is a condition sometimes described as the infiniteness of desire, 
imposing upon the finiteness of the body.”84 The problem arises when they do not recognise 
that this hunger manifests not an occasional lack but a condition of lack as “a name or a 
definition of the human, like being mortal.”85 Coriolanus and Volumnia are insatiable not 
because they are starving; they are starving because they are insatiable. The problem of 
scepticism is not brought about by the possibility of separateness, but by an inability, or an 




Philosophy’s Holding Environment  
 
Can there be such a thing as an ordinary-language psychoanalysis? Can philosophy become 
psychoanalysis and still know itself? For both Cavell and Winnicott the border between 
philosophy and psychoanalysis is permeable. More surprising even than Cavell’s association 
of philosophical issues and psychoanalytic concerns is Winnicott’s repeated 
acknowledgments in Human Nature that psychoanalytic issues may also be of philosophical 
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concern. The philosophical problem of scepticism is inserted in a list of matters that he deems 
pertinent to the issue of human development. Thus “the practical matter of the management 
of the mother and infant in the first hours and days after a baby is born,” significantly also 
including the first feed, is enumerated alongside “the claim of the psychotic that what is not 
real is real, and the claim of the antisocial child that what is untrue is true and that 
dependence (which is a fact) is not a fact” and, most importantly, “the philosophical problem 
of the meaning of the word ‘real’.”86  
The suggestion here is that the dynamics of the first interactions between mother and 
infant, for example at the breast, are pertinent to whether a psychotic, or an antisocial child or 
indeed a philosopher are able to distinguish what ordinarily counts as real. Winnicott’s view 
implies that a lack of good-enough care can flower into a certain type of philosophical 
inquiry.	A baby who has received persistently good-enough care might come to the 
conclusion that “I know that there is no direct contact between external reality and myself, 
only an illusion of contact, a midway phenomenon that works very well for me when I am 
not tired. I couldn’t care less that there is a philosophical problem involved.”87 For this baby 
the philosophical problem of scepticism has no real bite. On the other hand, the baby who, 
due to less-fortunate circumstances, was not able to create a sense of continuity between 
inner and outer is “really bothered by the idea of there being no direct contact with external 
reality.”88 In contrast to the fortunate baby, who is able to acknowledge separateness as a fact 
that does not necessarily threaten his integrity, for this baby “the philosophical problem 
becomes and remains a vital one, a matter of life and death, of feeding or starvation, of love 
or isolation.”89 Put somewhat simplistically, what is suggested is that good-enough care in 
early life can impart resilience to the philosophical problem of scepticism. In this picture 
psychoanalysis can become philosophy’s “holding environment,” a term which for Winnicott 
can mean both the maternal environment in which the infant is held and the analytic setting in 
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which the analyst helps the patient restore health by fulfilling a version of the maternal 
function for them.  
“It is not every philosopher who sees that this problem that besets every human being is a 
description of the initial relationship to external reality at the theoretical first feed; or for that 
matter at any theoretical first contact,” Winnicott writes.90 Winnicott’s sense that in the case 
of some children “some degree of primitive agony has to be carried on into life and living,”91 
is matched by Cavell’s claim that “in [his] own limited experience with children, certainly 
they are having problems that eventually, we know, as they flower, will become 
philosophical issues.”92 But it is with Winnicott’s notion that philosophical problems can be 
solved psychoanalytically that these projects leave common ground, undoubtedly also 
because Cavell’s interest in the infant is not clinical but figurative. Cavell notes that although 
Freud’s contention that the interpretation of dreams may lead to results that philosophy might 
be interested in can be taken to mean that “our vain waiting for philosophy is now to be 
replaced by the positive work of something else, call it psychoanalysis.”93 Alan Badiou has 
suggested that in maintaining that a grounding in anti-philosophy should be part of 
psychoanalytic training, Lacan characterized philosophy not as the guardian of knowledge 
but rather as the victim of a particular kind of ignorance.94 For Cavell, psychoanalysis is not 
such an anti-philosophy, neither is it a savior come to redeem philosophy. If he is critical of 
philosophy he is even more severe with psychoanalysis:  
 
But psychoanalysis has not surmounted the obscurities of the philosophical 
problematic of representation and reality it inherits. Until it stops shrinking from 
philosophy (from its own past), it will continue to shrink before the derivative 
question, for example, whether the stories of its patients are fantasy merely or (also?) 
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of reality; it will continue to waver between regarding the question as irrelevant to its 
work and as the essence of it.”95 
The most eloquent passage about Cavell’s commitment to philosophy as opposed to 
psychoanalysis is paradoxically also one of his most eloquent invocations of Winnicott. It can 
be found in the “Remarks from Discussion” following Vincent Colapietro’s paper in The 
Education of Grownups on voice and philosophy. Ruminating on the possibility of doing 
philosophy with children Cavell remarks:  
 
It gives me the creeps when certain kinds of adults are very impatient with them 
[children], perhaps dismissing them as silly. There is real work to be done here. 
Where does the light go when it’s out? ... And I think that those things can be 
addressed as though they are heartfelt problems, not just words. So what is the 
bargain you are establishing to be? A holding environment? That’s what Winnicott 
calls it, and a classroom is also a kind of holding environment.96 
 
Here, the place of philosophical instruction, the classroom, has become just as much as the 
space in which the parent–child dynamic unfolds, a “holding environment.” The audacity of 
this comparison lies in the conviction it expresses, namely that philosophical instruction can 
do if not the same, then some of the work that good-enough mothering can do in Winnicott’s 
developmental model: it can establish or re-establish health. 
Like Wittgenstein’s project, Cavell’s is first and foremost meta-philosophical, it is 
concerned with reforming or healing philosophy by offering an alternative, albeit still 
philosophical, path of inquiry. Like Wittgenstein’s, Cavell’s project can only be called anti-
philosophical if one concedes that he counters philosophy with nothing but itself. Where 
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Winnicott implies that philosophy is a condition once the first holding environment has 
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